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Abstract: This paper presents integrated algorithm for airborne system safety and reliability 
assessment. In general aviation (mostly up to EASA CS-23) and non-military unmanned aerial vehicles 
industry, safety and reliability assessment process still relays almost exclusively on human judgment. 
Recommended practices define processes for system modelling and safety assessing are based on 
analyst understanding of a particular system. That is difficult and time-consuming process. Commercial 
computation aids are extremely expensive with restricted (or closed) access to the solution algorithms. 
Together with this problem, rapid development of modern airborne systems, their increasing 
complexity, elevates level of interconnection. Therefore, safety and reliability analyses have to 
continuously evolve and adapt to the extending complexity. Growing expansion brings in the field of 
unnamed aerial vehicles systems which consist of items without relevant reliability testing.  Presented 
algorithm utilizes graph theory and fuzzy logic in order to develop integrated computerized mean for 
reliability analysis of sophisticated, highly interconnected airborne systems. Through the usage of 
graph theory, it is possible to create model of particular systems and its sub-systems in the form of 
universal data structure. Algorithm is conceived as fuzzy expert system, that emulates decision making 
of a human expert. That brings opportunity to partially quantify system attributes and criticality. 
Criticality evaluation increases level of assessment correlation with real state of system and its 
attributes.  
1 INTRODUCTION 
Airplane is highly developed, interconnected and sophisticated system. It has to perform dozens of 
functions at once just to sustain at flight. Modern airplanes combine heterogeneous system with 
different characteristic and requirements. Therefore, reliability assessment in the field of modern 
aviation is long extensively complex process involving analysis of vast number of mutually connected 
elements of different system. Each system affects other systems in diverse ways. However, safety 
assessment process still relays almost exclusively on human judgment. Recommended practices for 
system modelling and safety assessing are based on analyst understanding of a particular system. 
Review of system components, assemblies, elements function is followed by assessing of each failure 
modes and their resulting effects on the system is at least complicated process. 
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Easily accessible data structure should make safety and reliability process more effective. Developed 
integrated method of safety and reliability assessment utilizes powerful mathematical tool- a graph 
theory in order to represent complex system. It is natural step to represent system by drawing a graph. 
A set consisting of points along with lines joining pars of these points represent particular system and 
its interconnection. 
Rapid development of general aviation airborne system and unamend aerial systems increases 
necessity and scope reliability analysis of these systems. In these cases, there is insufficiency of input 
reliability data. Integrated methods adopt criticality assessment partially substitute input reliability 
data. Fuzzy systems are used as a mean how to establish criticality. Concept of item criticality is 
enhanced in order to achieve higher level of correlation with real state of system and its attributes.   
Standard criticality number used in safety and reliability analysis of airborne system is defined as a 
relative measure of the consequences a failure mode and its frequency of occurrence according to 
Military standard MIL-STD-1629A. Integrated method extended this definition to the wider level. It 
uses term Extended criticality to distinguish between standard criticality and criticality developed in 
this doctoral thesis. 
2 INTEGRATED METHOD ARCHITECTURE  
The main idea is established mean, how to combine particular instruments of safety and reliability 
assessment into unified effective process (see Figure 1). Function- oriented system model in the form 
of directed graph serves as a universal platform for the whole assessment process. Analysis decompose 
aircraft into various systems, a subsystems consisting of items. Each system structure is designed to 
provide specific function or functions. Items are connected by different types of interconnection 
(mechanical, electrical supply, electrical control, data, indication, etc.) to achieve intended function.   
 
Figure 1: Integrated Method Architecture 
Integrated method evaluates various functionality influences. Specific failure modes have different 
severity of their influence in relation to the main safety objective (explained in following chapter). 
Method provides knowledge database, which contains preliminary failure classification related to the 
main functions, support function and additional function (explained in following chapter), usually 
applied remedies and extended criticality evaluation inputs. They occur in with different probability 
and with deferent possibility of detection. 
 
Process  
Assessed system is at first functionally evaluated. Main and support functions are established. 
Integrated method provides airborne systems knowledge database. It enables to separate aircraft to 
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the particular system according to the ATA 100 (Spec 100: Manufacturers' Technical Data) chapters 
and sections. Further, it gives guidance to establish function identification, pre-defined potential 
failure modes, their possible effected and preliminary evaluate severity for fuzzy criticality evaluation. 
This database is accessible and modifiable during aircraft development.  
After functional description of system physical parts (items) and their interconnection are established. 
Integrated method provides another knowledge database which contains available reliability data (or 
preliminary failure modes occurrence levels).  
System is modelled as an interconnection of particular items in the form of graph. Function- based 
modelling allows analyst to establish required complex failure mode fault tree utilizing graph theory 
tools.  
Items extended criticality and system robustness evaluation concept is way how to handle expert 
knowledge summarized in critical reviews. Extended criticality analysis is a procedure by which each 
potential failure mode is ranked according to the combined influences [1]. Robustness evaluation 
handles system physical realization, protection against ambient influences, items maturity or isolation 
2.1 Function-based Modelling  
Concept of aviation safety is based on most essential safety objective- the ability to sustain at flight 
and land safely. Integrated method names this- Main Safety Objective (MSO). Airplane and its 
functions are designed, developed and tested to fulfil and ensure the MSO.  
These complex airborne system functions could be arranged into fixed hierarchy. Functions are than 
ranked above (or at same level) each other according to their influence to the MSO. Safety influence 
is possible to express in form of degree of decisive importance with respect to the crucial outcome in 
relation to the main safety objective. Functions with direct influence on main safety objective provision 
are labelled as Main function (MF). MF implement main safety objective. Functions which are designed 
to facilitate or support main function are labelled as Support function(SF). Support function could be 
taken as means to ensure higher functions.  
Function without relation to the main safety objective or not significantly contributing to the supply 
function performance are labelled as Additional functions (AF). Unlike traditional modelling methods, 
integrated method uses function- oriented modelling. Event- oriented models usually used in reliability 
analysis (for instance fault trees) are designed to identify combination of events (usually a failure) 
causing particular failure and it is possible to estimate probability of this failure. Each model describes 
combination of events for single case (failure). It does not describe complexity or connectivity of 
system items and functions.    
Suggested function- oriented modelling adopts graph theory principles to describe system 
interconnection. System items are mutually interconnected to ensure particular function; these 
connections are modelled as direct vertices between parent and child nodes (items) in direction to the 
function. For example, electric generator provides electrical power, then it is distributed through 
sequence of relays and buses to the electrical loads. Function oriented model allows to describe 
interconnection between various system (electrical, avionics, etc.) in relation to the particular function. 
In standard safety and reliability studies are usually used another special graphs- reliability block 
diagrams (RBD) and fault trees (FTA). Block diagram is a kind of pseudo graph. It is used for modelling 
of a system with assumption that system will operate if any sequence of components operates. The 
fault trees are used to represents important failure modes identified by the functional hazard 
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assessment. However, both techniques (RBD, FTA) require extensive calculation for just one failure 
mode. Also, there is only a poor correlation between real system and its representation. 
2.2 Graph theory application  
Applied function- oriented approach basically models system design. System consists of various items 
and their interconnection in order to assure intended functionality. Unlike design scheme, function 
base modelling represents sequence of function provided by items. Item is represented by node 
(vertices). For each node, there are various basic attributes like type, system participation, zone, 
occurrence, detectability, severity and extended criticality. Function interaction is represented by 
edge. For each edge, there are also various basic attributes type, system participation, occurrence and 
zone. Set of attributed could be extended or reduced for particular application.  
 
Figure 2: Function based modelling example 
Example in the Figure 2 describes fundamental difference between physical interconnection provided 
by drawing or scheme and function oriented model. Item u represents engine. Items w, x represents 
two channels of electric supply from airborne batteries or cross-feed (alternate generator). Item v 
represents changeover switch (flight crew selected one or other way to start the engine based on a 
given scenario). Physically, items w, v and x are not connected. However, their functions are inherently 
connected. Function based modelling is in integrated method based on so called function propagation. 
Items functions are interconnected to the chain in order to provide function. 
One of the key elements of integrated method architecture is to identify interconnection between 
items on the wide level. To adopt outlook of global level. Items are usually associated with multiple 
functions on system or local level. However, multiple of them is associated with many more function 
on the global level. 
It is essential to distinguish between particular types of connections in order to organized model to 
precise operational mode- complex system like avionics or electrical could be reconfigured for 
different mode like engine start or generator loss. These modes reflect system configuration in 
particular situation. Operational modes selection based on expert knowledge of analysis and system 
designers. 
2.2.1 Selected Graph theory application benefits  
System data structure in the form of graph allows to easily assess particular items, systems or function 
interconnection. 
Predecessors 
Predecessors are defined a set of nodes (vertices) coming before a given node in a directed path. This 
trivial attribute of graph is actually quite useful and illustrative.  
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The Figure 3 shows example of set nodes preceding a given node. The node represents R MAIN 
electrical bus of case study application. It is quite obvious, that R 
MAIN (right main bus of two channel electric system) functionality 
(ability to provide electrical power to its loads) is conditional to 
functionality of various items. Logically, system function is influence 
by many others factors (like control unit setting, engine regimes, 
operation modes). However, presented mean is highly useful for the 
analysis purposes or system study itself.  
Successors  
The other side of a coin is a successor. It is set of nodes coming after 
a given node in direct path. Continuing using the same example, the 
case study R MAIN is used as initial to whom other succeeds. Electric 
power is supplied to left axillary bus (AVION LAX), directly to the 
elevator trim fuse and possible to the main bus from right main bus. 
Than the electrical power is distributed through various buses and 
fuses to particular loads. These items provide particular function. Combination of support functions 
provides intended high function resulting in Main Function 
Centrality  
It is a structural (geometrically related) property of network. For these network measures, centrality 
refers to the geometric center or the level of importance. For simplicity purposes all graphs in this 
sections are undirected and simple.  
 Betweenness centrality (BC) 
This measure identifies and favours nodes that join separated systems (for instance 
electrical with avionics, electrical with engine control, etc.), dense subnetworks 
respectively, rather than nodes inside particular system. Betweenness centrality ranking 
determine item importance on the wider (global level).  
 Closeness centrality (CC) 
Unlike betweenness centrality, closeness centrality is a measure of how particular 
functions are tied together through the function of particular item or items. Closeness 
centrality ranking determines node importance due to function concentration. 
 Subgraph centrality (SC) 
It is a mean for characterizing nodes in network according to the number or closed walks 
starting and ending at the node. Close walks are appropriately weighted such that their 
influence on the centrality decreases as the order of the walk increases. 
 Centroid value (CV) 
Particular sub-system or item is functionally capable to influence other system and 
modules. Thus, item with high centroid value, compared to the average centroid value of 
the network, will be possibly involved coordinating the functionality of other highly 
connected items. A network with a very high average centroid value is more likely 
influencing functional units or modules. It is useful to compare centroid value to other 





Figure 3: Case study R MAIN bus 
predecessor example  
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Node topology paramter (NTP) 
Node topology parameter (NTP) serves as one of the inputs to the fuzzy extended criticality assessment 
described in following chapters. It reflects node influence on local and global level based on graph 
theory evaluation. It is based on previously defined and described parameters (BC, SC, CV) which 
reflect node position in the network. To determine relative importance of node it is used Metfessel 
allocation. In this case analyst has to quantitatively evaluate importance of parameters based on their 
influence on airplane systems. In the set of parameters, not all elements of the set Pai have the same 
relative importance in relation to the particular problem under consideration. This relative significance 
or importance is simply referred to as a weight parameter Wi. The analyst evaluates the it parameter 
with value bi, if it lies in the scale, e.g., bi <0, 100>. The more important the parameter is, the higher its 
score is. While the scoring method requires the user to provide quantitative evaluation of indicators, 







, 𝑖 = 1,2, … , 𝑛   (1) 
Where 𝑊𝑖 weight assigned to each parameter, 𝑏𝑖 is the number of assigned points, 𝑛 is the number of 
all considered parameters, 𝑏𝑃𝑎 parameter, 𝑖 index of the parameter, 𝑏𝑃𝑎—the total number of points 
assigned to all parameters. The resulted weights, determined from expert assessments. [2] 
Node parameters- betweenness centrality, subgraph centrality and centroid volume processed using 
described Metfessel allocation. Resulting node topology parameter is computed by following equation. 
𝑁𝑇𝑃𝑖 = 𝑝𝐵𝐶 ∙ 𝐵𝐶𝑖 + 𝑝𝑆𝑢𝑏𝐺 ∙ 𝑆𝐶𝑖 + 𝑝𝐶𝑉 ∙ 𝐶𝑉𝑖 b    (2) 
Where, 𝑝𝐵𝐶  is between preference, 𝐵𝐶𝑖 node processed betweenness centrality, 𝑝𝑆𝑢𝑏𝐺 processed 
subgraph centrality, 𝑆𝐶𝑖 node centrality, 𝑝𝐶𝑉 centroid volume preference and 𝐶𝑉𝑖 processed node 
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2.3 Item extended criticality evaluation  
Extended criticality level (and number) is generally descriptive attribute of item contribution to system 
(airplane, high level function) state of being critical to the MSO (to sustain at flight and safely land). 
Integrated method intends to extend criticality level concept by combining different influences based 
on precise critical review. 
Several aspects influence item extended criticality. These influences are projected in to set of inputs.  
There are four inputs in to the fuzzy criticality evaluation (see Table 1). Severity, occurrence, 
detectability and system topology are those inputs. 
FUZZY EXTENDED CRITICALITY EVALUATION INPUTS  
Type: Input evaluates:  
High-level Severity  Severity as the consequences of a failure mode. It considers the worst 
potential consequences of a failure, determined by the degree of 
influence to the MSO. It is related to the main and support functions 
(MF, SF).  
Node topology 
parameter  
Node topology parameter express node interconnection in the system. 
NPT reflects node influence on local and global level. It is based on 
previously defined and describe parameters. 
Detectability  It establishes change of failure mode detection using the expert 
knowledge expressed in form of linguistic terms and score tables.  
Occurrence  Complementary measure to quantify system reliability- ability to 
perform its function. Occurrence levels are used as strong inputs to the 
fuzzy extended criticality assessment representing probability of 
occurrence in the case of absence of relevant reliability data.  
Table 1: Fuzzy extended criticality inputs 
2.3.1 Fuzzy systems 
Fuzzy systems are used to evaluated extended criticality and robustness. It is a process of evaluating 
inputs to an output through these fuzzy sets. The most used fuzzy inference technique is Mamdani. 
Developed by Professor Ebrahim Mamdani of London university in 1975. Process consist of four main 
steps- fuzzification process (particular inputs used in integrated method are presented above), fuzzy 
inference rules evaluation, aggregation of rule outputs and de-fuzzification.  
Expert knowledge enters fuzzy system as a crisp inputs  a numerical volumes of discourse.Each type of 
input has special range of the discourse. Crisp inputs are fuzzified against the appropriate fuzzy set. 
Fuzzification express level of member ship in particular sets (for instance severity is partially medium 
and high). . Fuzzy rules consist of antecedent (expressed IF) and consequent (implication, expressed 
THAN). Antecedent part could consist of multiple parts, which are expressed in the configuration of 
fuzzy operators (AND, OR).  
Fuzzified inputs are applied to the antecedents of the fuzzy rule base to obtain single that represents 
the result of rule antecedents. Resulting number is applied in consequent part of fuzzy rule. Fuzzy rule 
base contains number of particular rules. Therefore, process of aggregation is used. It is a process of 
unification of the outputs of all rules. Each rule (clipped and scaled) consequents are combined into a 
single fuzzy set. Resulting number has to deffuzzified to obtain a crisp number expressing output 
(critically, robustness). It is a process of aggregation of fuzzy set into this single crisp output. Based on 
[3] 




Figure 4: Fuzzy inference process  
Fuzzification  
 
Fuzzification is executed in order to transforms crisps into a membership degree. It should express how 
inputs belong into linguistic terms used in the rules. Fuzzification process includes the Node topology 
parameter, High-level severity, occurrence, detectability inputs to into their fuzzy representation 
which can then be matched with the premises of the rules in the rule base.  
Inference rules  
It is a platform for abstracting information based on linguistic terms (expert´s judgment).. “It presence 
the way of thinking, that then we know something (hypothesis, premises) then we are able to infer or 
derive to the conclusion (consequent fact). Fuzzy base rule concept is most effective in the case of 
complex system modelling, when the system is observed by people because it makes use of linguistic 
variables can be naturally represented by fuzzy sets and logical connectives of these sets. Rules are 
based on natural language representations and models, which are themselves based on fuzzy sets and 
fuzzy logic. [4] 
Setting Antecedent  Consequent 
# Operator NTP  High- level severity Occurrence Detectability  Extended 
Criticality 
15 AND V/HIGH - FREQUENT - SAFETY CRITICAL 
16 AND HIGH - R/PROBABLE Not V/HIGH CRITICAL 
23 AND  MAJ OCCASIONAL  HIGH N/ CRITICAL 
Table 2: Fuzzy inference rules- illustrative example 
De-fuzzification  
De-fuzzification is done in the order to gain the fuzzy process single scalar quantity output. It processes 
to obtain crisps ranking from fuzzy conclusion set. Ranking represents the extended criticality level of 
the failure mode for potential corrective or remedial action. The de-fuzzification process requires, 
decipher the meaning of the fuzzy conclusion and their membership and resolve conflict between 
results. 
It is used centroid technique, probably the most used defuzzification technique. It finds where vertical 
line would slice the aggregate set into two equal masses. 
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Resulting extended criticality  
Fuzzy inference process results in extended criticality number for any given item of evaluated system. 




SAFETY- CRITICAL  An item/ subsystem is directly influences MF implementation 
and threaten MSO execution. It is indispensable to continue 
control safe flight and landing. 
CRITICAL  An item/ subsystem influences MF implementation. However, 
it is not directly critical to the MSO. Low level of occurrence 
level, high failure detectability reduces extended criticality 
number.  
MODERATE An item/ subsystem does not influence MF implementation nor 
MSO execution. It partially influences AF implementation.   
NOT CRITICAL  An item/ subsystem does not influence AF, MF implementation 
nor MSO execution. 
Table 3: Extended criticality levels 
2.4 System robustness evaluation  
Integrated method has to implement expert system parameters definition into a process of system 
evaluation. Every particular system has its own characteristics. System items should be separated 
avoiding common cause failure. In case of essential system (related to the high- level function) required 
redundancy has to be ensured. 
Item maturity, process of design, complexity and previous experiences with its usage in similar 
condition has to be taken under consideration. It ensures items meets environmental and software 
technical condition necessary for aviation application. Environmental requirements ensure that item 
is not vulnerable against changing temperature, humidity, attitude, inflected vibration, voltage spikes 
and many more. For integrated method development IEC 61508 [5] questionnaire is significantly 
modified for airborne system application. Each system parameter category (Separation/ Segregation, 
Diversity, Redundancy, etc.) is adjusted for basic types of system- mechanically based, electrically 
based, electronically based, hydraulics. Evaluation of questionnaire answers is newly designed for 
aviation application. Answer evaluation uses fuzzy logic to express expert knowledge (using fuzzy four 
fuzzy sets- No, Rather no, Rather no and Yes). Output of system parameters evaluation is robustness 
numbers for particular category. This numbers express property of system being strong and resistant 
in constitution. 
Evaluation of robustness numbers is same as process of fuzzy criticality evaluating. However, it adopts 
different membership inputs function, fuzzy inference rules and output membership function are 
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FUZZY ROBUSTNESS EVALUATION CLASSESS 
Category: Class  evaluates:  
Separation/ 
Segregation 
Functional/ physical separation/ segregation of particular system. Logic parts 
and interconnection. Establishes environmental protection of essential parts. 
It also covers ambient influences and collateral system effects.  
Diversity/ 
Redundancy 
Diversity of technology employment, Different physical principle 
employment, protection against common cause failures. 
Complexity/ 
Maturity 




Maintenance type, time intervals between inspections, etc.  
Environmental 
influences   
Ambient effects of environment (temperature, altitude- pressure variation, 
vibrations, etc.)  
Table 4: Robustness evaluation classes 
3 CASE STUDY  
3.1 Definition 
As a primary case study was chosen Institute of Aerospace Engineering VUT 486-DX4. It is a testing 
platform used for maintenance, safety and reliability analysis and advanced airborne diagnostic 
methods development application. It was developed on BUT Institute of Aerospace Engineering. The 
testing platform is used in several doctoral theses to demonstrate effectiveness of particular system 
engineering technique.  
 
Case study selected systems:  
 Electrical system (ELEC)-  It consist of 15 
nodes and 17 edges. It is convectional twin 
engine electrical system with two generators 
and two airborne batteries. Electrical power 
is distributed thought two main buses. Those 
buses could be mutually connected by 
BUSTIE contactor.  (see figure on the right) 
 Avionics system (AVIO)- It consist of 39 nodes 
and 40 edges. There are 11 multi edges pairs 
(that indicates complex interaction). Main 
items of integrated avionics units (GTN 1/2). 
 Elevator trim system (TRIM)- It consist of 13 
nodes and 14 edges. It is designed as electro-
mechanical system. Sources of trim 
movement are actuators connected to trim 
by mechanical levers.  
 Engine indication system (ENGIND)- It consist of 26 nodes and 28 edges. It is designed to 
collect measured engine parameters in order to indicated its status provide cautions and 
warnings. 
 Pitot- static system (PTST)- It consist of 6 nodes and 8 edges. System is design to provide 
static and stagnation pressure to the avionics system.  
 
 Figure 5: Case study electrical system  
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Each system has been selected to demonstrated particular type of airborne system. Avionics system is 
the most complex system. It consists of various types of items (aero-metrical, electronics, air pressure, 
etc.). It is directly connected to the several main function. Avionics system provides navigation, 
communication, information about aircraft horizontal and vertical orientation. Flight crew workload is 
highly related to the system functionality.  
Pitot- static system provides static and stagnation pressure to the significant avionics indicators which 
provide information about airspeed, altitude and vertical speed. It consists of pressure tubes, inputs, 
tubes and mechanical valves. Elevator trim system controls trailing edge of a control surface in order 
to stabilize aircraft in a desired attitude. Potential failures like disengagement could result in flatter 
occurrence with catastrophic or hazardous outcome. System represents electromechanical system. 
Source of tab motion is provided by actuator and then transferred through mechanical block into a tab 
movement.   
Engine indication system provides indication of present state of a given engine. It consists of dozens of 
sensors (temperature, pressure, etc.). Its functionality strongly depends on data acquisition unit 
functionality which process sensors inputs and provides indication. It is a typical example how function 
could be clustered by main processing unit.  
Electrical system serves as airborne source of electrical power. Its functionally directly influence other 
system functions. It is basically backbone of any larger airplane.  
3.2 Evaluation outputs  
Integrated method intends to establish advance mean how to assess airborne system safety and 
reliability. It is designed to help analysis and provide additional aspect of system and its items. This 
chapter briefly summarizes integrated methods outputs. 
Following table presents case study evaluation outputs-  global model topology parameters, evaluated 
system physical location (zones), most critical items base on extended criticality, list of most locally 
important items (based on BC) and list of globally most important items (based on Subgraph centrality).  
Global model topology  
Number of nodes  102 Diameter 12 Shortest paths  1193(11%) 
Number of edges  132 Multi edges node pairs 11 
Clustering coefficient 0,015 Zones  110, 220, 230, 310, 331, 341, 410, 
510, 610, 720, 730 
Most critical items 
(Global) 
Name  Extended criticality  Name  Extended 
criticality  
LLC (ELEC) 5,000815662 TR BUS (TRIM) 4,311464805 
RLC (ELEC) 5,000815662 L MAIN (ELEC) 4,252264671 
FUSE  A10 
(TRIM) 
5,000815662 R MAIN (ELEC) 4,252264671 
TR REL 
(TRIM) 
5,000815662 GTN #2 (AVIO) 4,181228147 
EHSI #2 
(AVIO) 





4,350370057 L DAU 
(ENGIND) 
4,151774628 
List of importance base on graph model evaluation  
Name  Local importance (SC) Name  Global importance (BC) 
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R DAU (ENGIND) 24,95 L MAIN (ELEC) 0,0436 
L DAU (ENGIND) 24,77 R MAIN (ELEC) 0,0365 
GTN #1 (AVIO) 16,21 BUSTIE (ELEC) 0,0238 
GTN #2 (AVIO) 16,19 AVION  LMB (ELEC) 0,0226 
AUDIO #1 (AVIO) 15,92 AVION  RMB (ELEC) 0,0186 
DME #1 (AVIO) 10,69 R DAU (ENGIND) 0,0181 
AVION  LMB (ELEC) 9,67 L DAU (ENGIND) 0,0181 
Table 5: Global model evaluation 
Table provides just a short version of these importance lists. Analyst could evaluate system only on 
local level or on a global level (interconnection between several systems). Extended criticality list 
identifies most critical items based on their probability of occurrence, likelihood of failure detection, 
severity of its allocated functions and item topology parameter.   
Following figure shows graph theory based model potential. System model could be filtered in order 
to highlight important item or interconnection. Engine indication system is a typical example how 
system functionality could be related to main item (controlling item). In this case data acquisition unit 
collect engine parameter in order to provide indication. Size of a node on figure corresponds with item 
local importance base on subgraph centrality.  
 
Figure 6: Case study engine indication system (node sizes corresponds with Subgraph centrality) 
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4 CONCLUSION  
This paper presents integrated method of safety and reliability of airborne systems developed in 
author´s doctoral thesis. Method is based on function oriented model, graph theory application and 
fuzzy logic.  
Function oriented modelling in combination with graph theory provide mean how to evaluate items 
interconnection on local and global level. Graph theory is used to describe model topology and 
evaluated item position in the model.  
In order to address different aspect of item, extended criticality is established. It expands standard 
criticality evaluation (in aviation industry) which is based only on item failure frequency and severity 
of its consequences. Extended criticality is based on potential failure detectability and rate of 
interrelation. All of these criticality aspects strongly depend on expert knowledge. Fuzzy logic is 
adopted in order to handle this expert knowledge.  
Integrated method is founded on presented bases and tested on case study. Further integrated 
method will be applied and tested in future projects of Institute of Aerospace Engineering (Brno 
University of Technology).   
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